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Abstract 
 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry has the potential to become the country’s leading ocean industry 
in the future. More than 99 % of the produced biomass is Atlantic salmon and trout. Norwegian fish 
farming is characterised by operations that are susceptible to changing weather, wind and currents, and 
face challenges in terms of safety for fish, personnel, environment and material assets. Previous 
research and accident analyses reveal an incomplete knowledge of risk factors during aquaculture 
operations. In order to raise standards of safety in the workplace, operators need to be aware of the 
challenges to safety in their work environment. The objective of this paper is to describe and discuss 
the current status of the implementation of risk assessments in the Norwegian aquaculture industry, 
according to Norwegian legislation and compared with recommended requirements in the Norwegian 
standard for risk assessments (NS 5814). This standard largely follows ISO 31000 for risk 
management. We also propose, test and evaluate an improved approach to risk assessment that will 
ensure stronger operator involvement. Our findings demonstrate that there are several gaps between 
the current practice and the standard. At the present time, operator involvement is not sufficient 
according to the regulatory requirements of internal control. Although the approach improves critical 
steps in the risk assessment procedure, it remains to be implemented in the fish farming industry. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
  
The Norwegian aquaculture industry has the potential to become the country’s leading ocean industry 
in  the future (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2017). This ambition will require 
new biomass production sites to be established, and major environmental and technological challenges 
still have to be resolved (Bjelland et al., 2015). The aquaculture industry has become a driving force 
for the development of new technology, concepts and management strategies that meet the 
requirements for sustainable production in harsh environments. An important task in this development 
is to evaluate how safety risks in aquaculture can be reduced by integrating risk assessments in the 
engineering phase, as well as implementing new strategies for fish farm operations. 
The fish farming industry is characterised by operations that are susceptible to changing weather, wind 
and currents, all of which affect the availability, safety and integrity of fish farms. Fish farming is thus 
a challenge to technology manufacturers, fish welfare and occupational safety. In Norway, being a fish 
farmer is the second most dangerous profession after capture fisheries in terms of rates of occupational 
injuries (Aasjord and Geving, 2009, Holen et al., 2017a) Between 1994 and 2014, 21 fatalities were 
registered, and the rate per 10,000 person-years worked ranged from 0 to 10.8 (Holen et al., 2017b), 
with an average fatality rate of 2.9. Since 2005, there have been nine fatalities during maintenance or 
other marine operations related to aquaculture production (SINTEF Ocean, 2018). Operations 
involving cranes or winches are the major contributors to these incidents (Holen et al., 2017b), many 
of which are performed as part of work-intensive delousing procedures. Lice and infections pose a 
hazard to fish welfare and health, as the treatment procedures cause stress and involve rough handling 
of the fish. Violations of the Animal Welfare Act will be investigated and may lead to fines 
(Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2009). Systematic regimes to monitor fish welfare and 
conduct delousing are mandatory (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2016b, Food 
Safety Authority Norway, 2017).   
Besides threatening fish welfare delousing also raises the risk for occupational injuries and for escape 
of fish. After years of growing numbers of escaped fish, action was taken after 2000 to reduce the 
number of incidents caused by structural breakdowns and technological failures (Jensen et al., 2010). 
Operational errors and structural deficiencies due to insufficient or missing safety barriers are now the 
most frequent causes of escapes (Directorate of Fisheries, 2017b). An analysis of farmed salmon and 
trout escapes between 2010 and 2016 has shown that holes in the net are the major direct cause, and 
these are mostly due to bad handling or conflicting integrity with the bottom weight system of the fish 
cage (Føre and Thorvaldsen, 2017). 
Escapes are not only a threat to the environment, but also contribute to the negative reputation of the 
industry (Olsen and Osmundsen, 2017). Fish farmers report that personal safety may be set aside in 
order to prevent a- fish escape accident (Størkersen, 2012, Thorvaldsen et al., 2015). A study by 
Holmen and Thorvaldsen (2015) showed that the aquaculture industry lies behind comparable 
industries in implementing systematic risk management. Previous research and accident analyses 
reveal a considerable lack of understanding of the risks involved in marine operations in aquaculture 
(Holmen et al., 2017b, Holmen et al., 2017c, Holen et al., 2017a, Holen et al., 2017b, Jensen et al., 
2010, Thorvaldsen et al., 2015, Føre and Thorvaldsen, 2017). In this context, fish farmers’ knowledge 
of operational hazards, experience and skills are important organisational safety barriers. Risk 
assessments and personnel training may therefore be important safety factors. This calls for a more 
comprehensive approach to risk management in the fish farming industry. A recent study recommends 
that five dimensions of risks need to be assessed in a fish farm operation (Yang et al.). These are risks 
to personnel, material assets, fish welfare, the environment and food safety.     
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Risk assessment is a core activity of risk management and consists of identifying hazards, analysing 
and evaluating risks, and among outcomes are action plans for risk treatment during the design and 
operational phases of a production unit (ISO, 2018, Rausand, 2011). A starting point for the fish 
farming industry could be to implement improved strategies for thorough assessments of operational 
risks as a basis for developing effective preventive measures, as well as increasing workers' awareness 
of the risks inherent in daily work. Recognition of occupational hazards is fundamental in order to 
implement efficient safety measures in aquaculture (Moreau and Neis, 2009, Myers and Durborow, 
2012). In Norway, it is a regulatory requirement that operating personnel are to be involved in the risk 
assessment process, in order to ensure that relevant workplace hazards are identified and understood 
by those actually performing the work (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 1996).  
The objectives of the paper are to present the status of risk assessments in the Norwegian aquaculture 
industry, and thereafter to discuss how the implementation of risk assessment might be improved in 
order to fulfil the intention of the standard and of the regulations. Part of the study has been published 
previously in Holmen et al. (2017c), which is a brief presentation of the regulatory requirements for 
risk assessments in aquaculture operations, a summary of current practices and an recommended 
improved approach to hazard identification and risk analysis, in the Norwegian context. The present 
paper extends both the data material and the scope of the study by comparing current risk assessment 
practices step by step with the risk assessment process recommended by the standard NS 5814 
(Standard Norway, 2008), which largely follows the international standard for risk management, ISO 
31000 (ISO, 2018).  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 introduces the aquaculture industry context and its safety 
challenges, as a background for the objectives of this paper. Section 2 presents requirements for risk 
assessments in Norwegian aquaculture regulations and standards related to risk assessments. Section 3 
presents the results from a systematic analysis of the current practice for risk assessments and is 
followed up by a suggestion as to how the practices could be improved (Section 4). The results are 
discussed in Section 5, and the conclusions in Section 6. 
2 REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS FOR RISK ASSESSMENTS IN NORWEGIAN 
AQUACULTURE 
2.1 THE NORWEGIAN FISH FARMING INDUSTRY 
The Norwegian finfish aquaculture industry comprises all sizes of companies from large global 
enterprises to family-owned fish farms in small communities. There is also a growing number of 
manufacturers and providers of equipment, components, vessels and services to the aquaculture 
industry. Norway is the world's second largest exporter of fish after China, but the largest producer of 
finfish in marine and coastal environments (FAO, 2016). More than 99 per cent of the Norwegian total 
produced biomass is farmed Atlantic salmon and trout (Directorate of Fisheries, 2017a), which is the 
focus of this paper. 
There are normally six to 12 circular plastic collar net cages in one fish farm(Jensen et al., 2010, Holen 
et al., 2017a). The number of cages differs according to the site and production license. Each cycle of 
fish is grown out in seawater for 18 months before it is slaughtered. The operations manager is 
responsible for both production and personnel safety. Each fish farm employs about three to six 
workers (in this paper also referred to as fish farmers or operators) who are responsible for daily 
inspections, feeding and maintenance. The feeding barge, which is the "operations centre" of the farm, 
contains rooms for equipment and feed storage, the feeding system, as well as offices, meeting rooms 
and accommodation for the workers. 
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Designated work vessels, from 8-15 m length overall (l.o.a.) and equipped with capstans and/or a 
crane, are used for inspection and maintenance of the fish cages. The daily inspections are performed 
in accordance with official regulations on aquaculture operations (Norwegian Ministry of Trade 
Industry and Fisheries, 2008), and are intended to ensure that the net cages are in order and to assess 
fish welfare. The operators perform such tasks as maintenance, removal of dead fish from the net 
cages and monitoring the amount of salmon lice on a sample of fish every week. Specialised service 
vessels and crews, either the company’s own or belonging to subcontractors, are chartered for heavier 
operations such as mooring and delousing. 
A wide range of equipment for monitoring and caring for the fish is mounted inside the net cage 
(Holmen et al., 2017a). Examples include hideouts (shelters) for wrasse (small size "cleaning fish" 
which feed on salmon lice), air tubes, cameras, gear for removal of dead fish and much more. The 
equipment may represent hazards to the fish or the net and has to be handled carefully if it has to be 
removed before an operation can start. During operations, extra devices and equipment may be 
needed; e.g. remotely operated vehicles (ROV), tubes for pumping fish or a remotely operated 
cleaning system positioned by a crane. All this extra gear adds complexity to the operations. 
Furthermore, aquaculture operations are not standardized, neither between companies nor between fish 
farms in different regions, and different equipment may be used, depending on what is available 
(Holmen et al., 2017a). All of these factors have consequences for the risk assessments, because 
hazards must be identified for each specific operation. 
2.2 REGULATIONS 
The administration of the Norwegian aquaculture industry is fragmented as regards legislation and the 
regulatory authorities involved. Coastal area management, allocation of fish farm licences, planning 
and establishment of sites, inspection of fish welfare and health, food production and environmental 
protection are allocated to six different ministries and regulatory authorities. In certain areas the audits 
are delegated to regional or local community offices, which in turn increases the potential for 
differences arising in how cases are dealt with (Robertsen et al., 2016). The requirements regarding 
risk management in production are also fragmented (Holmen et al., 2017c).  
Performing and documenting risk assessments for all aquaculture operations is mandatory, as are 
activities related to breeding and farming fish and keeping them in good health. Risk assessments are 
statutory and are imposed by five regulatory authorities: The Directorate of Fisheries, Food Safety 
Authority, Norwegian Maritime Authority, Norwegian Labour Inspection Agency and the County 
Administration. These bodies are responsible for the regulations regarding fish welfare, food safety, 
fish farm technical standard, vessel design and equipment, health, work environment and safety, and 
the environment. The relevant aquaculture legislation and regulations are described in Holmen et al. 
(2017c) and summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Norwegian regulations, statutory acts and authorities sanctioning risk assessments in aquaculture. 
Topic Regulation 
Statutory Act(s) 
Norwegian 
regulatory 
authority  
Focus of risk 
assessments 
Purpose 
Fish welfare 
and health 
Food safety 
Regulation on the operation of aquaculture production sites 
(Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2008) 
Regulation on internal control to comply with the aquaculture 
legislation (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2004) 
Food Act (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2003) 
Animal Welfare Act (Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 
2009) 
Food Safety 
Authority 
Health control 
parameters and 
water quality. 
Assess risk of 
contamination of 
food for consumers. 
Support technical, biological, 
economic and environmental 
sustainable aquaculture production. 
Promote good health and welfare 
for aquaculture species. 
Fish escape 
prevention 
Regulation on the operation of aquaculture production sites 
(Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2008) 
Aquaculture Act (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 
2005) 
Directorate of 
Fisheries 
Minimise risk of 
fish escapes and 
implement 
systematic 
preventive 
measures. 
Support technical, biological, 
economic and environmental 
sustainable aquaculture production. 
Technical 
condition of 
fish farm 
Regulation on technical requirements to floating aquaculture plants  
(Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2011) 
Directorate of 
Fisheries 
Assess risks during 
engineering, 
manufacturing, 
installation and 
operation of fish 
farm. Include risk 
of fish escape. 
Prevent fish escape by securing the 
proper technical standard of the 
fish farms. 
Vessel design 
and 
equipment; 
Safety 
management 
of daily 
operations 
Regulation on construction and inspection of smaller cargo vessels 
(Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2015)  
Regulation on safety management for smaller cargo vessels, passenger 
vessels, fishing vessels (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and 
Fisheries, 2016a) 
Ship Safety Act (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 
2007) 
Maritime 
Authority 
Marine operations, 
vessel design and 
stability. 
 
Ensure technical standard of 
vessels and equipment on board. 
Systematic, daily management and 
follow-up of identified risks.  
Physical 
environment 
Internal control regulation (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, 1996) 
Working Environment Act (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, 2005) 
Aquaculture Act (Norwegian Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 
2005) 
County 
Administration 
Directorate of 
Fisheries 
Sustainability of the 
aquaculture 
location and risk for 
emissions to the 
surroundings. 
Support continuous improvements 
in regarding the work environment 
and safety, and protection of the 
environment against pollution and 
a proper waste treatment. 
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Occupational 
health, 
environment 
and safety 
Internal control regulation (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, 1996) 
Working Environment Act (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, 2005) 
Labour and 
Inspection 
Agency 
All physical, 
chemical and 
biological, 
organisational, 
psychosocial and 
ergonomic 
elements. 
A safe and sound work 
environment for all workers. 
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2.3  STANDARDS 
The requirements for the technical condition of fish farms are described in Norwegian standard NS 
9415: Marine fish farms - Requirements for site survey, risk analyses, design, dimensioning, 
production, installation and operation (Standard Norway, 2009). Since NS 9415 in itself is not 
regulatory for the aquaculture industry, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 
(2011) introduced the "Regulation on technical requirements for floating aquaculture plants" in order 
to ensure compliance with NS 9415. This regulation states that aquaculture installations shall comply 
with the technical safety level in NS 9415 (or similar) and this is to be certified by an accredited body. 
The Directorate of Fisheries is the controlling authority regarding the technical components of a fish 
farm. The standard NS 9415 refers to NS 5814 for risk assessments (Standard Norway, 2008), and the 
requirements for risk assessments in NS 5814 are thereafter brought into effect. For other areas the 
standard is voluntary, although some companies have linked their internal risk assessment 
requirements to NS 5814. 
Table 3 shows the steps in the risk assessment process, according to NS 5814. This process is aligned 
with the risk assessment process of ISO 31000, although not identical. 
3 CURRENT PRACTICE FOR RISK ASSESSMENTS  
3.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The methodological approach in this paper includes data collection from several sources of 
information; interviews and observations in the field, analysis of risk assessment documentation, as 
well as four workshops. The information obtained from participants in interviews and workshops has 
been treated anonymously and has been handled according to the principles of the Norwegian Data 
Protection Official for Research (NSD, 2018). The methodological approach is described in detail in 
Holmen et al. (2017c). 
3.1.1 Interviews and observations 
The interviews and observations aimed to assess the current risk assessment practices at fish farms and 
on board service vessels. Interviews with workers and observations took place during maintenance 
and/or daily operations in June and August 2015, June 2016, and March and November 2017 on board 
four service vessels and at five fish farms. The fish farms are owned by three of the largest Norwegian 
farmers of Atlantic salmon and located in the three northern aquaculture regions of Norway. Two of 
the sites are owned by the same company but located in different regions. The service vessels had been 
chartered to perform maintenance on fish farm structures and moorings.  
The vessel crews, fish farmers and operational managers were asked about their involvement in risk 
assessment and to explain how this is implemented in work practices and safety precautions in daily 
operations. During the visits, samples of the risk assessment documentation were checked. Additional 
interviews with HSEQ staff and managers were conducted either by phone or in the informant's office. 
Table 2 shows the categories of informant, type and number of interviews.  
Altogether 24 interviews were carried out, involving 30 persons from six Norwegian aquaculture 
companies (fish farmers and service providers). These companies vary in size from well-established 
enterprises with more than 1,500 employees to companies of less than 100 workers. Meetings were 
arranged with two regional management groups; the regional director, the technical manager, the 
production manager and the HSEQ coordinator in each of two regions of one company. The main 
purpose of these meetings was to present the findings from the observations at their production units. 
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During the meetings, the management was asked questions regarding implementation of risk 
management and mitigation measures.  
Table 2 Informant categories, type and number of interviews. 
Informant 
category 
Individual interview at 
workplace 
Individual interview by 
phone/in office 
"Group interview" in 
office 
Fish farmer 4   
Operational manager fish 
farm 
2   
Service vessel crew 5   
Operational manager 
vessel 
4   
HSEQ 
coordinator/manager 
1 4  
Management group 
(4 persons each) 
  2 
(8 persons in total) 
General manager  2  
Total 16 6 2 
 
The information gathered through the interviews and observations provided us with an overview of 
current practices, deficiencies and needs for improved risk assessment in aquaculture. 
3.1.2 Documentation 
Risk assessment documentation was also gathered from three fish farming companies, in order to 
identify how the risk matrixes and evaluation criteria were designed according to the regulatory 
requirements. The documentation is a combination of examples of risk assessment matrixes, 
descriptions of risk acceptance criteria, and written procedures describing how risk assessments should 
be performed in the company. This is summarised in section 3.3. 
3.2 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRACTICES 
This section presents the current practices of fish farming companies regarding risk assessments and 
compares them with the requirements set out in NS 5814. Table 3 lists the deviations between the 
recommended steps in the risk assessment process and the current practice in Norwegian fish farming. 
The qualitative data presented is based on interviews and documentation from six companies (see 
previous section). The company management is assumed to be committed to the process in their risk 
management policy. HSEQ staff is often responsible for developing templates or standard checklists as 
an assisting tool for the operational managers at the fish farms or managers/skippers on board the 
vessels, who are responsible for carrying out and documenting the risk assessments at their production 
units. A regional management, which may include a production manager responsible for the biological 
production, is usually responsible for the implementation of the risk management policies approved by 
the company's top management. Our study revealed that at some locations the risk assessments were 
conducted only at managerial level. Risk assessments should be performed before production starts 
and revised yearly or more frequent if changes are made to equipment, technical installations or 
operational procedures.
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Table 3 The deviations between the recommended steps in risk assessment (RA) according to NS 5814 (Standard Norway, 2008) and  the current practice in Norwegian fish farming. The right 
column specifies which position/management level in the company who is responsible for the step. 
Recommended steps in risk assessment 
process  Deviations 
Responsible in 
company 
1. Planning   
1.1 Initiate process, define problem and scope - RA is not performed before decisions are made. 
- There is no plan for the work. 
- There is no description of the background for RA, which parties are involved and how they 
could be affected. 
Management 
(decisions) 
↓ 
HSEQ staff 
(suggest, implement) 
1.2 Organise the work, establish work group - No verification of whether there is agreement between the work, the requirements of the 
standard and the management's specifications. 
- The working group's competence relevant for the RA is not documented.  
- The person responsible for RA is not necessarily familiar with the contents of the standard. 
- The management does not document that the RA has been carried out by competent 
personnel. 
- The management does not document that relevant stakeholders are involved.  
Production manager 
↓ 
Operational manager 
(Assisted by HSEQ 
staff on request) 
1.3 Choose method and data sources - Company internal templates for RA are used, but the choice and sources of data for risk 
analysis are not verified in writing. 
HSEQ staff 
(preparation of RA 
template) 
1.4 Establish description of system and object 
to be analysed, document conditions and 
assumptions 
- The object of the analysis is not described in detail. 
- There is no evaluation of whether premises, assumptions and simplifications are reasonable 
and realistic. 
Operational manager 
2. Risk analysis   
2.1 Identify hazards and undesired events - There is no documentation regarding potential undesired events that have not been not 
further analysed (e.g. not relevant, minimal risk). 
Operational manager 
2.2 Analyse causes and likelihoods - The list of causes identified for each undesired event may not be complete. 
- RA of technical systems are not complete with respect to human and/or organisational 
aspects. 
- There is no documentation verifying that the analysis has been performed at an adequate 
level of detail based on the objectives and limitations of the RA, decisions to be made, and 
availability of relevant/accurate data. 
Operational manager 
2.3 Analyse consequences - Short-term consequences are dealt with more thoroughly than long-term consequences. Operational manager 
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- There is no systematic consideration of existing measures which reduce the severity of the 
consequences, or of other conditions that could influence the outcome of an undesired 
event. 
-  There is insufficient documentation that verifies that the analysis is concluded at an 
adequate detailing level based on the objective and limitations of the RA, decisions to be 
taken, and availability of relevant/accurate data. 
2.4 Risk description - The uncertainties are not assessed and included in the risk description. Operational manager 
3. Risk evaluation   
3.1 Evaluate risks against risk acceptance 
criteria 
- In some cases, the risk may be underestimated. Operational manager 
3.2 Identify mitigating measures and their risk-
reducing effect 
- The list of measures identified to eliminate, reduce likelihood or consequence of an 
incident may not be complete. 
- There is no documentation of the expected effect of measures. 
Operational manager 
3.3 Document and conclude - There is no documentation of conclusions from the RA to be used as the basis for risk 
management. 
- The documentation neither refers to literature/data sources, nor documents the work 
process and the choices taken regarding methods, limitations, and possible need for 
further work. 
- Deviations from the standard is not justified. 
Operational manager 
 
The findings are summarised and commented in section 3.5.
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3.3 RISK MATRIX DESIGN AND RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 
The standard for risk assessments, NS 5814 (Standard Norway, 2008), states that the description of 
risks may be quantitative or qualitative, i.e. it is up to the company to choose the preferred method 
(Table 3). All the companies that participated in this study use qualitative risk analyses and risk 
matrices to describe risks. The prevailing approach is to describe risk as the product of potential 
consequences and likelihood. The result is evaluated against risk acceptance criteria expressed by the 
colours green (acceptable risk - no further action needed), yellow (lowest acceptable risk – consider 
additional safety measures) or red (inacceptable risk – risk-reducing measures shall be implemented). 
The risk priority numbers (RPN) are suggested by personnel in the HSEQ department and decided by 
the management. One of the companies performs risk assessments along eight consequence 
dimensions: fish health, fish welfare, fish escape, human health and safety, reputation, food threat, 
food safety, environment. Table 4 shows examples of risk-matrix designs in three companies. The 
consequences depend on the area analysed, and in Table 4, the consequences for health, safety and 
work environment (HSE) are used for comparison. 
Table 4 Risk matrix design and risk evaluation criteria as defined by three fish farming companies. 
Company 
no 
Size Type of risk Consequence priority 
number (example HSE) 
Likelihood Risk priority number 
(RPN) 
1 5x5 Fish health, 
fish welfare, 
escape, HSE, 
reputation, 
food threat, 
food safety, 
environment 
1=Insignificant, no 
absence 
2=Minor, absence < 3 
days 
3=Significant, absence 
3-14 days 
4=Serious, long time 
sick-leave, permanent 
injury 
5=Catastrophic, fatal 
 
1=Very unlikely 
(once every 10th 
year or less) 
2=Less likely (once 
in 1-10 years) 
3=Likely (once per 
year) 
5=Quite likely (1-
10 times per year) 
10=Very likely 
(More than 10 
times per year) 
≤ 4 Acceptable risk 
5<10 lowest acceptable 
risk. Preventive 
measures shall be 
implemented, further 
mitigations to be 
considered. 
≥ 10 Unacceptable risk. 
Risk-reducing 
measures must be 
identified and 
implemented before 
operation can start. 
2 6x6 Fish health, 
fish welfare, 
HSE, food 
safety, 
external 
environment, 
environmental 
aspects 
1= No injury 
2=Minor injury, no 
medical treatment 
3=Minor injury with 
medical treatment 
4=Serious injury 
5=Serious injury, long 
time harm 
6=Fatal 
1=Not likely at all 
2=May have 
happened 
3=Yearly 
4=Monthly 
5=Weekly 
6=Daily 
≤ 6 Acceptable risk 
8-16 Lowest acceptable 
risk. 
>16 Unacceptable risk. 
3 5x5 Fish welfare, 
escape, 
personnel 
safety, 
reputation, 
food safety, 
environment 
1=Very low, no injury 
2=Low, injury with no 
absence or reported to 
NLIA1 
3=Medium, absence 
injury and/or reported 
to the NLIA 
4=High, permanent 
injury 
5=Very high, 
permanent disability or 
death 
1=Extremely low, 
never heard of 
2=Low, have heard 
of 
3=Likely, may 
happen once 
4=Much likely, 
may happen a few 
times 
5=Very likely, may 
happen several 
times 
≤ 4 Acceptable risk 
5<15 Risk-reducing 
measures may be 
implemented 
≥ 15 Unacceptable risk. 
Risk-reducing 
measures shall be 
implemented. 
1Norwegian Labour Inspection Agency 
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3.4 INFORMAL RISK ANALYSES 
Safe job analysis (SJA) is a risk-analysis method that is performed to identify potential hazards during 
operations, and to implement measures which reduce the risks (Rausand, 2011). SJA should ideally be 
carried out by the work team prior to the operation, and is usually carried out for less frequent, 
hazardous operations, dangerous routine jobs or new procedures. Other triggers for a SJA might be a 
new vessel or new operators participating in a complex operation. Important objectives of SJA are to 
make operators more aware of inherent risks, and to discuss possible actions to mitigate undesired 
events. 
SJA was originally a process comprising several steps and with thorough documentation of the risk 
assessment of each task within the operation (Rausand, 2011). Some fish farm companies have 
implemented a template for a SJA "light", which assumes that a risk assessment for the work operation 
or procedure already exists. The "light" version is then a way to remind the personnel of the 
operational risks, as well as to update the procedure if it has been a while since it was last used. 
One of the companies in this study has a written procedure for SJA, which states that SJA must be 
carried out ahead to all work operations that a) are not already described in a procedure; b) have not 
been conducted for a long time; and c) for which personnel lack relevant experience/training. Another 
company calls all personnel in to a "pre-operation meeting", in which the risk assessments are 
presented and a memo subsequently documents the content of the meeting. Some operational 
managers have an informal meeting which has previously been referred to as the "cup of coffee chat" 
(Holmen et al., 2017c). Although such meetings are not a SJA as described in the literature, the 
intention of the risk analysis method is achieved: bringing together all operators, both in-house and 
hired services, reminding them of the operational hazards, discussing responsibilities, sharing 
knowledge and agreeing on safe job practices. When this study began, SJA was new to several of the 
companies, and their staff had little knowledge of how to run a SJA. However, during the two years of 
data collection, more companies have started to do SJAs regularly and have established internal 
templates or checklists as a tool for their operations managers. 
Some aquaculture companies report that planning operations is a challenge, involving complexities 
due to changes in the weather, attacks by fish parasites and other biological factors, as well as the 
availability of experienced operators, well-boats or other essential subcontractor services. The industry 
is therefore seeking tools to support good practices for operational planning. A systematic SJA process 
in good time could therefore be a useful means of mapping and identifying the most important risk 
factors involved in the operation. 
3.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The largest gaps between the recommended steps for risk assessments in NS 5814 and current practice 
were found in the planning phase, and regarding the involvement of workers in the analysis phase.  In 
many cases, risk assessments were not properly planned or given sufficient priority during day-to-day 
farming and maintenance tasks. The involvement of operators turned out to be in sufficient or 
completely lacking. This is an important part of the risk assessment procedure that needs be improved 
to achieve the regulatory requirement of operator involvement in internal control (Norwegian Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs, 1996).  
In the risk analysis step, the hazards were listed but the chains of events were not thoroughly 
described. Nor was it clear how well the risk assessments were related to actual work practices. The 
persons responsible for the risk analyses often had little if any documented formal training. Moreover, 
the methods for identification of hazards were often based on templates, which might not be connected 
to the different operations which are the sources for the potential hazardous events. In general, 
documentation of details in the work process, choices and limitations taken, was not satisfactory 
according to this standard.  
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All the companies that participated in our study employed semi-quantitative descriptions of risks in 
matrices, and used worksheets to keep track of possible hazards and their sources, causes, likelihoods 
and consequences. The number of types of risk as well as the design of the risk matrices differ 
somewhat between the companies. Neither the consequence priority numbers nor likelihood grading 
(expressed as frequencies) are standardised within the industry. Hence, the risk priority numbers 
(RPN) vary significantly and are not comparable between the companies. 
Sufficient involvement of operators may not be prioritised when there are practical tasks that need to 
be done. This is compensated for to a certain extent by the introduction of safe job analyses (SJA). An 
SJA is carried out prior to operations that are regarded as being of particularly high risk, because they 
are rarely performed, previously described in written procedures (e.g. introducing new equipment or 
techniques), or if the personnel have only limited experience of the particular operation to be 
performed. SJA was gradually implemented in the fish farming industry during the study period. 
 
4 IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE - CLOSING THE GAPS  
4.1 A NEW APPROACH 
In this section, suggested improvements are first described for each main step of the risk assessment 
process, as described in NS 5814 (Standard Norway, 2008): planning, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation(Table 3). . This is then summarised in a stepwise recommended approach aimed at closing 
the most essential gaps identified during the comparison with the requirements for risk assessments in 
NS 5814 (previous section). 
4.1.1 Planning 
To ensure that risk assessments are well anchored in the organisation, stakeholders must be properly 
involved in the planning process. An organising team should be appointed by the top management and 
given responsibility for planning and conducting the risk assessments. If the risk assessment is 
performed at a fish farm, the operational manager should be responsible. The safety representative 
elected by the employees, a duty statutory in the Working Environment Act (Norwegian Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, 2005), should also be involved. It is necessary to have personnel 
experienced with risk assessments in the group, e.g. HSE personnel. The group shall define problems 
and the scope of the work and specify which types of risk are to be assessed. The group should also 
decide on a method for hazard identification and risk analysis, and this should be suitable for the data 
sources available, system/object and risk type to be analysed. If a template for risk assessment is used, 
feasibility must be assessed, and if necessary, revised. 
4.1.2 Risk analysis  
Current practice for the risk analysis step is close to the requirements of the standard, as is to be 
expected because it is usually regarded as the "core" of the risk assessment process. The 
documentation of risk assessments is largely based on this step. One necessary improvement is to 
identify hazards and undesired events associated with the various tasks that make up an operation, 
including the use of equipment. Implemented risk-reduction measures must be taken into 
consideration. Today's prevailing practice is to pick these out from a template or to list hazards and 
undesired events without the operational context, which in itself might influence the risk level. A 
template should only be used as a checklist for possible hazards or undesired events, as well as for 
possible actions to mitigate risks. 
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4.1.3 Risk evaluation  
The evaluation against risk acceptance criteria need not be a central task for the entire work group, as 
in practice it might end up as a mere "exercise" to avoid "red" entries in the risk matrix. The 
organising team, and/or HSE personnel, may finalise this step. The contribution of operators should be 
aimed at identifying additional safety barriers and other mitigating measures in order to reduce the 
likelihood or consequences of high risks, as well as prioritisation of measures. This task should be 
prioritised when limited time is available for gathering all the personnel involved. Operator 
participation in this step can be ensured by involving the safety representative or another person 
representing the operational staff. In many cases, the operations manager has considerable experience 
with the operations, as he/she has often started working as an operator. Table 5 is a stepwise summary 
of the suggested improved approach for risk assessments in the industry. NS 5814 should be used as a 
reference. The following section describes the testing of this approach at four workshops. 
Table 5 Stepwise specification of the suggested improved approach for risk assessments in the fish farming industry. The 
suggested process aims to close the gaps identified between current practice and the requirements in NS 5814 (Standard 
Norway, 2008). 
 Improved approach Comment 
Planning 
A Establish an organising team appointed by the 
company management. 
Include HSE personnel with training in risk 
assessments, who will be responsible for 
documentation. The farm operational manager 
is responsible, and the safety representative 
should be involved.  
B Identify work operation(s) of high risk. Should be based on operational experience and 
incident reports. 
C Decide which type(s) of risk to assess. 
a. If applicable, assess and revise template. 
b. Choose a suitable method for risk analysis 
according to the type of risk to be 
assessed. 
Should be specified in company risk 
management procedure; e.g. fish welfare, HSE, 
food safety (see Table 4). 
D Gather a group of operators and managers 
responsible for performing the operations. 
Workshop with operators: Mix fish farmers and 
service vessel crews if possible and relevant for 
the operations involved. 
E Describe operations at individual task level, 
including critical gear/equipment used. Agree 
on safe job practices. 
 
HSE personnel should update the written work 
procedure if deviations are identified and 
justified. 
Risk analysis 
F Identify hazards and undesired events 
associated with each task/equipment.  
Workshop with operators. 
G Analyse causes and likelihoods for each 
hazard/event, taking existing risk-reducing 
measures into consideration. Analyse 
consequences. 
Workshop with operators. 
H Describe risks in terms of product of potential 
consequences and likelihood. 
Organising team may perform this step. 
Risk evaluation 
I Evaluate risks against risk acceptance criteria. Organising team may perform this step. 
J Identify additional mitigating measures to be 
taken and evaluate their risk-reducing effect. 
Mitigating measures should be discussed at 
workshop. The organising team may perform 
the evaluation of risk-reducing effects. 
K Document risk assessment process. HSE personnel. 
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4.2 TESTING AND EVALUATION OF THE APPROACH: WORKSHOPS 
The improved approach outlined above was tested and evaluated in four workshops with industry 
participants. The practical organisation of the workshops have previously been described in detail by 
Holmen et al. (2017c). The steps of the NS 5814 risk-assessment process were followed, and the 
process was organised as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 The involvement of personnel in the risk assessment process. 
Step in NS 5814 (Standard Norway, 2008) Organising 
team 
Workshop (operators, 
HSEQ staff and 
managers) 
HSEQ 
staff 
Planning 
• Initiate process, define problem and scope 
• Organise the work, establish work group 
• Choose method and data sources 
• Establish description of system and object to 
be analysed, document conditions and 
assumptions 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Risk analysis 
• Identify hazards and undesired events 
• Analyse causes and likelihoods 
• Analyse consequences 
• Describe risk as a product of potential 
consequences and likelihood 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
(X) 
 
 
 
 
(X) 
Risk evaluation 
• Evaluate risks against risk acceptance criteria 
• Identify mitigation measures, compare 
alternatives and their risk-reducing effect 
• Document and conclude 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
(X) 
X 
 
(X) 
 
 
(X) 
 
Table 7 (adapted from Holmen et al. (2017c)) lists the number and category of participants in each of 
the workshops, as well as the service vessel operations that were the topics of each workshop. These 
operations were identified as being of high operational risk, based on current analyses of occupational 
accidents and fish escapes, as well as the participants’ own experience and perception of hazards. All 
these operations involve the use of winch and/or cranes. In workshop 3 it was decided to analyse 
"preparations for fish transfer" and "maintenance operations", which include several of the other 
operations. Lifting of coupling plates precedes anchor setting and/or tightening of moorings. 
Delousing involves lifting of the sinker tube, which is also an initial stage in the preparations for fish 
transfer. No templates were used in any of the workshops. The risk analysis method in the workshops 
was based on the preliminary hazard analysis described by Rausand and Utne (2009). The focus for 
hazard identification was limited to risks to personnel and escape of fish. 
 
Table 7 Work operations for risk assessments discussed in the workshops, including number and category of participants: 
Managers (M), fish farmers (F), service vessel crew (S), technology providers (T). 
Workshop no.: 
Participants: 
No. of participants: 
↓Operations 
1 
M F S 
20 
2 
M F S 
17 
3 
M F S T 
12 
4 
M F S T 
13 
Clean floating collars     
Tighten moorings     
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Set and fasten anchors in seabed     
Swim fish between net cages     
Mount nets in cages     
Lift coupling plates     
Preparations for fish transfer     
Maintenance operations     
Lift sinker tube     
Remove old moorings     
 
The above activities cover steps A-C in Table 5. The next step was to gather operators and managers 
to do the risk analyses. Up to four operations were analysed per workshop (Table 7). To do this 
efficiently, the participants were divided into groups, each of which described one operation. The 
groups were initially placed at separate tables (Holmen et al., 2017c). After a while, the groups rotated 
to the next table and added information to the description by the previous group. The work operations 
(object of analysis) were thus described in detail by all the participants, and a thorough description of 
the work tasks and involved objects/tools was produced. The results showed that while the operations 
usually were performed in accordance with the written procedures, a few major discrepancies at 
certain stages were also revealed. These were dealt with as a part of the following risk analysis 
process.  
The second assignment for the groups was to identify hazards and undesired events associated with 
each operation described above (step F in Table 5). Again, each group started on one operation, and 
rotated to the next table until all the operations had been analysed. This was repeated for the analysis 
of causes, likelihoods and consequences, and identification of mitigation measures (step G). Steps G-J 
were finalised in workshops 1 and 2, but were not fully tested in workshops 3 and 4. In these 
workshops, each hazard/undesired event, possible causes and consequences were assessed 
qualitatively. The priority in the workshops was to establish thorough descriptions of the operations, 
and to identify hazards and undesired events associated with each task of the operation. The operators 
were involved throughout the process of listing existing safety barriers/measures and suggesting 
further risk-reduction measures, as this also increased their understanding of how safety can be 
improved in their daily work. The organising team documented the process (step K).  
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 CURRENT PRACTICES FOR RISK ASSESSMENTS 
5.1.1 Implementation challenges 
The aquaculture industry is obliged to perform and document risk assessments in accordance with the 
legal framework presented in Table 1. Complying with requirements from five authorities is a time-
consuming and resource-intensive task. The priorities of the companies involved in the interviews and 
workshops were found to be affected by possible damage to the profits or the reputation of the 
industry. The media's often negative attitudes to the fish farming industry has been shown not only to 
influence the public, but also to limit the regulatory focus on sustainability to environmental risks 
(Olsen and Osmundsen, 2017). The present study shows that most efforts are put into the 
documentation of actions to mitigate environmental hazards, i.e., fish escapes. 
Several challenges were identified regarding current risk assessment performance. First, the companies 
find it difficult to allocate sufficient time to gather all relevant personnel for risk assessments. As a 
result, at some fish farms this may be done only at managerial level. Second, some of the participants 
lack motivation and see it as an unavoidable "exercise" to satisfy the demands of the authorities or 
their own management. Third, finalising the risk documentation is regarded as more important than 
checking whether the significant risks are understood and mitigated. Fourth, the scope of the risk 
assessments is broad. It may take several days to perform assessments of all types of risk as regulated 
by the authorities. Any prioritisation is affected by public opinion and consumers’ concerns, and 
possible sanctions by the authorities. Fifth, once the risk assessments have been finalised, the follow-
up work with detailing of action plans and improvements of procedures may not be prioritised, giving 
the wrong signal back to the organisation that the only point of the risk assessments is to satisfy the 
documentation requirements in the regulations. These challenges are further addressed in the following 
sections. 
5.1.2 Variable quality and content 
The information that we gathered through interviews and observations shows that the quality and 
implementation level of risk assessments vary considerably, between both companies and different 
sites run by the same company. Some companies, typically the larger ones with well-established safety 
management functions and trained staff to maintain the systems, have implemented computer-based, 
online systems for quality and safety management, and have written procedures on how to perform 
risk assessments, specifying the types of risk that are to be included. The smaller companies are, so 
far, less systematic in documenting the activities required of them. There are also observations that 
suggest a lower level of implementation on board service vessels than at fish farms. Several of our 
informants had not personally been involved in the risk-assessment process, and work was still under 
way to complete the risk assessments for some vessels. The vessel operators explain that this is 
because they have less time available for safety management on board. The operations managers at the 
fish farms also have more predictable working hours, in some cases more or less "fixed" office hours, 
and have access to an office and to online quality-management systems. Service providers are 
experiencing a growing demand from fish farming companies to document work operations and 
compliance with safety requirements, and this is likely to be a driving force for subcontractors to the 
fish farming companies to implement systematic risk management and risk assessments. 
The risk assessments that we studied without exception are semi-quantitative and are described in risk 
matrices. These are known to have limitations, as they are mainly based on subjective assessments that 
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depend on individual experiences (Cox, 2008). Public reports on fatalities, serious occupational 
injuries and fish escape may be used as qualitative input to the assessments. As an easy tool to 
visualise and document the outcome of the hazards identification and risk analysis process, risk 
matrices serve their purpose for aquaculture companies, as long as they understand their limitations. 
5.1.3 Level of implementation 
A recent survey of safety management practices among management and office staff in the Norwegian 
aquaculture industry investigated several aspects of safety management implementation (Kongsvik et 
al., 2018). A total of 135 persons from 15 companies participated in a web-based survey, and risk 
assessment and SJA was among the topics. For example, the following question was asked; "Have 
formal risk assessments for the work at the fish farm been carried out during the past four years?" As 
many as 98% of the respondents responded positively to this, and 86% reported that all employees 
participate in the risk assessments, while 81% said that risk assessments are actively employed to 
reduce occupational risks. These numbers are relatively high compared to the feedback from the 
participants in the qualitative study described here. However, the survey was aimed at managerial 
level, and the answers might well have been different if the operator level had been asked the same 
questions. 
The situation in the aquaculture industry regarding the risk of occupational injury does seem to be 
improving (Holen et al., 2017a), as well as fish escape. Escapes of farmed fish have significantly 
diminished since 2006 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2017b). The major cause of fish escapes is holes in 
the net (Føre and Thorvaldsen, 2017), which indicates that  risk assessments should be focused around 
events which lead to tearing of nets. One explanation for the reduction in escapes is that the authorities 
have improved their inspection routines. Another is that the industry, which is rapidly growing, needs 
to improve its reputation in order to recruit qualified workers. This increases the motivation for top 
management to allocate sufficient resources to risk management. According to industry 
representatives, a fewer incidents happen during complex operations than before, and this is explained 
by improved routines for planning and comprehensive risk assessments. However, the safety 
management survey showed that there still is room for improvement (Kongsvik et al., 2018).  
Compared to other ocean industries such as the offshore petroleum sector, safety management systems 
in fish farming are not yet as comprehensive (Holmen and Thorvaldsen, 2015). Fewer resources are 
allocated and motivation for performing paper-work is low. A more practical approach to improving 
the impact of risk assessments, and in turn risk management, would therefore be beneficial for this 
industry. 
5.2 CLOSING THE GAPS 
The following section, "Improved approach to risk assessments", discusses improvements regarding 
operator involvement and hazard identification. Planning, time and resource allocation are addressed 
in the section "Limited resources require efficiency and good planning" (5.2.2). Different aspects of 
documentation are discussed in all sections. Templates are specifically addressed in "Additional 
recommendations" (5.2.3). 
5.2.1 Improved approach to risk assessments 
The intention of the risk assessment process is to systematically gain a greater understanding of the 
risk situation in the work environment. The operational staff have the practical experience, and they 
daily face the hazards and make decisions to prevent accidents from happening. As the improved 
approach recommends, their involvement should start at the stage where the system is described, by 
mapping the stages in the operations, which they know well, and thereafter by identifying the hazards 
associated with each stage. Causes and consequences should also be discussed in groups that include 
operators, managers and HSEQ staff. Thus, if the managers follow up by documenting the process and 
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establishing a shared action plan for risk-reducing measures, an important part of the regulatory 
internal control will have been implemented (Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
1996). 
The process of describing risks and evaluating them against risk acceptance criteria can be finalised by 
the operational management supported by HSEQ personnel. Decisions on which preventive measures 
to prioritise are closely connected to budget discussions at management level, and the suggested 
approach will ensure that the management is familiar with levels of risk in the workplace. In audits or 
accident investigations, the risk assessments are used by the authorities as a quality indicator of the 
risk management. They will also record which risk-reducing measures the company has identified and 
perhaps implemented. It is therefore essential that companies can document that they have performed 
thorough risk assessments as the basis for mitigating risks inherent in the work environment on vessels 
and at fish farms.  
The workshops (Holmen et al., 2017c) produced detailed descriptions and risk assessments of work 
operations and equipment, as well as a list of preventive and risk-reducing measures. A common 
understanding of the work environments and operations was established between the operators and 
managers.  An example is how the coupling plate should be lifted out of the sea. The correct way to do 
this is to attach the crane to the chain which connects the buoy to the coupling plate, and not lift the 
buoy itself, unless the buoy is certified for lifting. The added hazards of this irregular procedure were 
thoroughly discussed. Differences in procedures might also be explained by the kind of equipment that 
is available at each fish farm. Participants appreciated having the opportunity to exchange their 
experiences across regions and companies. This was an added value of the new approach. Industry 
associations may take this further and develop industry standards for risk assessments and knowledge 
sharing. The Norwegian construction industry is a good example of this, as it has already developed a 
collective standard for risk assessments of construction work; NS 5815 (Standard Norway, 2006). 
The most important improvement due to the approach presented in this paper, compared to established 
practices, is the strong involvement of the operators. This is a requirement described in the internal 
control regulation. The use of group discussions and of documenting input on flip-over sheets lowers 
the threshold for contributions from everyone. Furthermore, the focus is shifted from lowering the 
RPN to acceptable levels, towards a shared understanding of the need for measures that can eliminate 
hazards or reduce the consequences of any incidents that do occur. This approach thus supports the 
overall goal of the required risk assessments, which is to identify means of reducing risk to fish 
welfare, food safety, and technical and personnel safety at aquaculture workplaces. These risk 
assessments can thus also be used as a tool for operational planning, as well as a basis for safe job-
analysis checklists. 
Furthermore, the organisation of the workshop, with several groups providing input to the different 
operations in turns, resulted in more comprehensive recordings of the hazards than any group would 
have produced on its own. This can be achieved in a company by gathering operators from several fish 
farms and/or service vessels. This will also be an arena for organisational learning, as the operators 
can exchange experience and knowledge regarding safe and efficient job practices. Finally, it is likely 
that needs and ideas for improved engineering solutions that eliminates hazards are identified. The 
results of systematic risk assessments are thus of high interest also to manufacturers of equipment. 
This was demonstrated when technology providers were invited to two of the four workshops (Holmen 
et al., 2017c). 
5.2.2 Limited resources require efficiency and good planning 
The greatest challenge to performing high-quality risk assessments is probably that of allocating 
enough time to involve the operators sufficiently according to the Internal Control Regulation 
(Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 1996) and NS 5814 (Standard Norway, 2008). 
Competent and committed managers are required in order to involve the operators properly. Qualified 
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HSEQ staff should ideally be of support to the operational managers during the risk assessment 
process and be a driving force in the organising team. The larger companies usually have such 
personnel available who could relieve the operational manager from some of the planning activities. In 
the smaller companies, several management functions may be gathered on one person, thus making it 
hard to allocate time for a proper risk assessment involving the operators. The suggested improved 
approach is not less time-consuming; however, it can increase the efficiency of the process in that a 
more comprehensive list of risks and mitigation measures are documented. Furthermore, the learning 
outcome of the process is likely to be greater because each operation and its inherent hazards are 
analysed in detail: a common best practice is put in writing, the operators take part in the identification 
and description of causes, consequences, likelihoods, risks, risk-mitigating measures and evaluation of 
their effect.  
During the fish production phase, which lasts for approximately 18 months, there are few available 
time windows for this resource-intensive work. Usually there are two teams at each fish farm working 
shifts, although only one operational manager and at some farms, a deputy manager. One strategy 
could be to treat risk assessment efforts as a mandatory seminar and bring the off-duty team together 
away from the fish farm for a couple of days. This can be done at intervals until all relevant operations 
and components have been analysed. However, this may come in conflict with the Working 
Environment Act's regulations on the maximum permitted working hours per week and month 
(Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2005). The work shifts at fish farms are already 
carefully tuned to be in line with the requirements (Thorvaldsen et al., 2017). 
Another strategy would be to allocate time for updating risk assessments between fish generations, 
which is normally a period of two or three months. However, during this period of no fish to farm, 
major maintenance activities to prepare for the new stock are scheduled, and the focus is therefore on 
the technical aspects of planning the next production cycle. The risk assessments are the basis for an 
efficient risk management both at the fish farm as well as in the company. Ideally, the company 
management should plan the production cycles so that the fish farm personnel are also given sufficient 
time to update the risk assessments. 
5.2.3 Additional recommendations 
Several of the companies that participated in this study have designed templates which are adapted to 
each vessel or farm. Using a template can increase the effectiveness of the risk assessment process, 
since possible hazards, causes and consequences are already listed for different systems and the 
template serves as a checklist. Regular updates based on the outputs of risk assessments performed as 
recommended in this paper will improve both the content and the impact of the templates. A thorough 
template based on best operating practice could simplify risk assessment updates for complex 
operations, e.g. when new technology or maintenance schedules are implemented, or a new crew joins 
a vessel. 
The use of safe job analysis (SJA) has increased during the past few years, as it is recognised that this 
is a useful tool for a carrying out systematic risk analysis in operations, i.e. stepwise mapping of 
hazards, causes, consequences and risk-reducing measures associated with a given work task or 
operation. However, at present, there are probably as many versions of how to perform SJA, both in 
content and template for documentation, as there are aquaculture companies. The petroleum industry 
has introduced recommended guidelines for SJA (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, 2017). These 
guidelines describe step by step how to conduct SJA, and could be adapted for use in the aquaculture 
industry to establish a common procedure. An SJA performed as described in these guidelines would 
to largely satisfy the requirements in the planning and risk analysis steps of the risk assessment 
process described in NS 5814. SJA is therefore a suitable methodology for risk assessment of 
operations (see step C in Table 5). 
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As section 2 mentioned, the regulatory requirements for risk assessments are fragmented, as they are 
statutory instrument promulgated by five different authorities (Holmen et al., 2017c). Risk 
management is therefore dealt with in separate parts of company management systems. These are also 
audited separately, although the Directorate of Fisheries and the Food Safety Authority coordinate 
inspections because they are regulatory authorities for separate parts of aquaculture legislation (Table 
1). Yang et al. suggest that five dimensions of risk should be considered in a single risk-management 
system; risk to personnel, risk to material assets, risk to fish welfare, risk to the environment and food 
safety. There is thus a potential for merging the requirements of the individual sets of regulations into 
a unified management system. The aquaculture industry should be encouraged to establish common 
regulations and guidelines for a holistic risk-management system, which would combine all relevant 
types of risk.  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes and discusses the implementation of risk assessments in the Norwegian 
aquaculture industry, and compares the current practice with the recommendations in the Norwegian 
standard NS 5814 (Standard Norway, 2008). An improved approach to risk assessment was suggested 
and evaluated.  
Previous studies show that the Norwegian aquaculture industry has safety challenges which could be 
mitigated by systematic risk management, of which risk assessment is a core activity. An aquaculture 
industry standard for risk management across the regulatory disciplines is lacking, while other sets of 
regulations may include safety requirements that address similar objectives. This results in a 
fragmented approach to risk assessments. Practices for risk assessments differ greatly between 
companies in the Norwegian aquaculture industry. There is therefore a potential for making significant 
improvements to the situation by implementing a systematic and standardised approach to risk 
assessments. 
The comparison between the recommended steps for risk assessments in NS 5814 and current practice 
found the largest gaps in the planning phase, and regarding the obligatory involvement of workers in 
the risk analysis phase. Operator involvement was often either inadequate or missing. Furthermore, the 
link between operations as a source of risk and risk assessments was not clear, especially if the 
template did not support the breakdown of operations into tasks. Finally, documentation was 
unsatisfactory according to the requirements in the standard. 
We developed and tested an improved approach to risk assessment based on preliminary hazard 
analysis in cooperation with the aquaculture industry (Holmen et al., 2017c). The largest difference 
compared to current is that our approach describes each operation in detail, assesses the hazards, 
describes and evaluates the risks associated with each task, instead of merely listing general hazards 
and assigning risk levels to them. Hazards associated with known high-risk operations as cranes and 
winches were thus described in the relevant context. This approach will increase the likelihood for 
identifying possible new hazards arising if the lifting operation is changed or if the crane is used in a 
new setting. This approach has been tested and evaluated in a series of workshop and demonstrated a 
high level of involvement by the operators. The outcome of the process was not merely a 
comprehensive list of hazards and mitigating actions. According to the operators, they appreciated the 
opportunity to discuss best practices with colleagues and operators across regions and companies. 
Thus, the improved approach as described in this paper also contributed to an improved common 
understanding of how operations should be performed with safety in mind.  
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